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Review Article
 *
 
 
FIRST DO NO HARM: LAW, ETHICS AND HEALTHCARE. Sheila A.M. McLean, 
ed., Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006. ISBN: 0 7546 2614 8 £65.00 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In issue 7(2) of this Journal, Sheila McLean wrote a heartfelt acknowledge of the 
career achievements of John Kenyon Mason, widely known as Ken.
1
 McLean had just 
completed the editing of this book, which opens with the statement that “[a] glance at 
the list of contributors to this festschrift to celebrate Ken Mason’s contribution to 
Medical Law should be sufficient to show the reader just how much Mason is loved, 
respected and admired” (xiii). This is no mere hyperbole. The 37 chapters and two 
prefaces are written by a striking collection of no fewer than 44 contributors, the list 
of whom reads like the Who’s Who of medical law. The result is a book that is not 
easily reviewed. Rather than impose my own thematic structure,
2
 this review article 
will seek to convey the essence of the book as it stands by addressing the chapters 
sequentially, though providing no more than a brief summary of some. The 
Hippocratic injunction of the title provides a unifying theme only because it is capable 
of carrying divergent interpretations. I hope to show that this plurality of themes and 
perspectives is—excuse the pun—just what the doctor ordered for medical law, as it 
cannot fail to excite the thoughtful mind and invite further inquiry. 
 
II. The chapters  
 
Chapters 1–5 
 
The first chapter, written by Jonathan Montgomery,
3
 seeks to examine the question of 
whether medical law can be legitimate when it seeks to “dictate or proscribe a 
particular course of action in the face of [moral] controversy” (2). Montgomery 
rejects many familiar responses to the legitimacy problem as unconvincing or 
insufficient, including those seeking to distinguish public from private morality, those 
seeking to apply a human rights-based approach (which he analyses by reference to 
the rights recognised by the European Convention of Human Rights), and those 
relying on the procedural legitimacy provided by parliamentary democracy. He 
summarises the issues by mapping out three tracks, with his own being advanced as 
the middle path and the two side-tracks purportedly shown to be dead-ends. What I 
shall call the “particular moral position” track is dismissed on the basis that it denies 
the legitimacy problem, moves from moral debate to legal rules without concern for 
moral pluralism, reduces medical law to the technical application of bioethics, and is 
vulnerable to challenge by those who adopt a different morality “as it could give no 
account of why their moralism should be resisted” (13–14). The diametrically 
opposed position, which I shall call the “patient choice” track, views the legitimacy 
problem as insuperable and allows medical law to reduce to no more than “a 
combination of consumer law (in relation to private relationships) and public law (in 
relation to state spending)” (14). Montgomery’s middle path considers the legitimacy 
problem to entail a significant degree of moral indeterminacy but nonetheless sees a 
role for medical law in providing structure for moral decision-making. 
 
Montgomery presents a variant of the Millian harm principle in which the proscribed 
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harm to others is interference with the ability of individuals to make their own ethical 
decisions. Thus, the role of law is to “protect both patients’ and professionals’ rights to 
exercise their judgment and prevent outsiders from dictating to them what should 
happen” (15). The result is a compromise that will only persuade those who accept it 
from the outset. Fortunately for Montgomery, many do. The rejection of the particular 
moral position approach, of which I am an adherent,
4
 turns on a number of popular 
assumptions and elisions, in particular, the equation of moral disagreement with 
rational indeterminacy. The central problem is that Montgomery’s purportedly mid-
way position is not free of the challenges faced by the “particular moral position”. We 
are being invited to wear the emperor’s cloak of neutrality to protect us from the wind 
of pluralism. As Brownsword argues later in this book, the harm principle is far from 
morally neutral; its content and application cannot escape choices between 
irreconcilable moral views. 
 
The next three chapters address related but ultimately very different topics. Robin 
Downie seeks to defend casuistry against some objections and suggest that it has 
important contributions to make to medicine.
5
 Kenneth Boyd examines the interaction 
between Hippocratic ideals in medicine and democratic ideals in society.
6
 Ian 
Freckelton explores recent developments in the regulation of health care practitioners 
in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the UK.
7
 
 
In the fifth chapter, Lawrence Gostin explores the impact of the WHO’s International 
Health Regulations (IHR).
8
 These were first adopted in 1951, as the International 
Sanitary Regulations, and fundamentally revised in 2005. According to Gostin, the 
2005 revision was a laudable response to an otherwise disastrous confluence of 
frightening outbreaks and pandemics that provided the political motivation to 
challenge outdated assumptions about sovereignty, horizontal governance, and 
entrenched power. Gostin persuasively argues that the result is a positive step towards 
a coherent international law regime for global health. As Gostin concedes, however, 
international law is ultimately only a small part of effective monitoring and 
management of international health threats.  
 
Chapter 6–10 
 
Chapter six is the first of the book’s chapters to focus on the regulation of human 
research and experimentation, a topic brought to the forefront of medical law by 
Mason and McCall Smith’s pioneering work Law and Medical Ethics.9 In this chapter 
Don Chalmers tracks the transition of medical research ethics from the Nuremberg 
Code and the later Declaration of Helsinki to current formal regulatory structures, 
focusing on the Australian experience.
10
 
 
The regulation of research and experimentation is not, however, the focus of chapter 
seven. Instead, Gerard Magill analyses the limits of malpractice litigation in the 
context of medical error and patient safety.
11
 Magill notes that there is a growing 
awareness of the problem of medical error in US healthcare as a result of a number of 
official reports and sensationalist media coverage to the effect that deaths from 
medical errors “were the equivalent of a 747 jet going down every day killing all its 
passengers” and “hospital beds should post a warning that medical care can seriously 
damage your health” (101–102). He argues that experience in road safety, aviation, 
and occupational health shows that a reduction of errors is more likely to brought 
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about by adopting procedures designed to reveal and address causes, than by 
procedures designed to attribute blame and punish individuals for their errors. Thus, 
he opines, the US should seek to move away from a “professional sanctions model”, 
as epitomised by existing malpractice litigation practises, to a “proactive and 
preventive patient safety model” (111). These issues are all too familiar to non-US 
medical lawyers watching similar moves towards patient safety models closer to 
home, albeit from arguably less litigation obsessed starting points. In the UK, the 
patient safety movement underlines significant reshaping of the professional 
regulation of doctors, including the introduction of the new revalidation procedure for 
doctors.
12
 It is therefore a little surprising that this chapter, in a book dedicated to one 
of the UK’s leading medical lawyers, should fail to make even a passing reference to 
developments outside of the US. 
 
Chapter eight—written by Veronica English, Rebecca Mussell, Julian Sheather, and 
Ann Sommerville—seeks to examine the limits of patient autonomy and the ability to 
demand and refuse treatment, focusing on genetic testing and knowledge, medical 
research on patient data, cadaveric organ donation, and mental health law.
13
 They 
contend that autonomy (defined as “the capacity to make reasoned decisions and act 
on them”: 117) is often overvalued relative to other moral values. The other moral 
values identified by the authors have a distinctly communitarian flavour: “altruism 
and concern for others” (118); “the common good” (119); “emphasis on 
responsibilities of individuals are well as rights” (121); and “all patients’ 
responsibilities for promoting the general good” (130). This chapter therefore more 
than nods in support of Mason’s own self-declared communitarian persuasion. It is, 
however, a pity that neither the epistemic basis of their version of communitarianism 
(beyond the merest mention of social contract theory: 119) nor its details receive 
considered analysis. 
  
Perhaps not surprisingly, Graeme Laurie’s chapter nine is one of the most explicitly 
influenced by Mason’s work.14 He takes as his starting point an unpublished paper in 
which Mason sought to choose the five most significant UK medical law cases of the 
past 30 years. Mason’s communitarian views on the limits of patient autonomy led 
him to chose Re B, Gillick v Norfolk and Wisbach Area Health Authority, Re MB, A-
G’s reference (No. 3 of 1994) and R v Cox.15 Laurie explicates and defends Mason’s 
view that Re B is a seminal case on the treatment of those who lack autonomy and that 
Gillick is defensibly interpreted as recognising the legal authority of mature minors to 
consent to treatment but not to refuse treatment that would prevent ongoing suffering 
or death. Consideration is then given to Re MB and A-G’s reference, on which Laurie 
considers the objections raised by Mason and presents his own view that issues 
concerning the status of the fetus in a maternal/foetal context “may be an area where 
maintaining clear-line thinking—even if the thinking itself is far from clear—is the 
only acceptable judicial policy” (145). The discussion of R v Cox indicates that Laurie 
and Mason disagree on the potency of the empirical slippery slope argument against 
active euthanasia informed by experiences of the Netherlands—Mason is persuaded 
by this argument, Laurie is not. This thought-provoking chapter is one of the best in 
the book. It highlights the degree to which moral controversies underlie medical law 
and, in my view, provides further examples of situations where the adoption of 
different ethical premises will lead to very different conclusions.
16
 
 
In chapter 10, Deryck Beyleveld analyses the concept of privacy in relation to 
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research on patient data.
17
 It is not appropriate for me to comment on this chapter as it 
forms the starting point for a piece that I have co-written with its author.
18
  
 
Chapters 11–15 
 
The re-occurring theme of medical research is also the focus of chapter 11, in which 
Pamela Ferguson presents an interesting analysis of an empirical study into why 
patients participate in clinical trials.
19
 This is followed by Margot Brazier’s engaging 
chapter on the many topics on which she and Mason have disagreed, on some of 
which she indicates that she is no longer sure that the disagreement remains.
20
 These 
topics are stylishly bound together by an evocative hypothetical scenario in which we 
are asked to consider Sam, a boy whose cells are found to have a dramatic capacity 
for regeneration and are therefore considered by scientists to hold the potential “to 
understand and cure most human diseases unrelated to the aging process” (189). By 
manipulating this scenario—so that Sam is considered as a living three-year-old, a 
road kill victim, and an embryo—Brazier is able to evoke an array of ethical and legal 
questions on the use of embryos and tissue as medicines and research materials. She 
argues that the potential for use of humans as medicines is bedevilled by what she 
refers to as the “tyranny of language”—the rhetorical import of the descriptions that 
we give to our bodies, parts, or their uses (201). Brazier reveals that the potential of 
humans as medicines has led her to reconsider her opposition to embryo research and 
invites the reader to consider whether our duty to rescue others entails a duty to make 
“available parts of ourselves to save others” (202). This chapter therefore provides 
powerful examples of the practical significance of different moral stances on the 
extent and limits of our positive duties. 
 
Alastair Campbell, in chapter 13, addresses biobanks (large-scale genetic databases).
21
 
Campbell identifies four key ethical issues: the question of consent, self-interest and 
altruism, the potential harm to participants, and the issue of the custodianship and use 
of biobank resources. The first of these is, perhaps, the most vexing and is laudably 
summarised by Campbell: 
 
The whole rationale of the biobank enterprise means that those enrolling cannot be told 
precisely what uses will be made of the resource in the future. Since the data gathering 
will last several years and the resource itself will continue to grow and to be available for 
use for at least two or three decades, the aims of the project must necessarily be described 
in very broad terms. It is clearly impossible to know at the outset the range of possible 
research uses. Thus, the consent being gained is quite different from the standard consent 
to participation in health research, when a full description has to be given of a specific 
research proposal, with a justification for the use of tissue or data, as well as a statement 
of the likely outcomes of the research. (204) 
 
Many differing responses have been offered. Some theorists suggest a terminological 
move whereby the language of “consent” or “informed consent” is replaced with 
terms such as “blanket consent” (to highlight the breadth of the future research)22 or 
“blind consent” (to highlight the lack of information on the details of the future 
research).
23
 Campbell himself notes that some argue that the consent can be fully 
informed and valid if participants are aware of the broad purposes of the future 
research and all the safeguards on the control and use of the data, whereas others 
regard the initial consent as no more than provisional. Campbell urges readers to 
recognise that every attempt to re-contact participants brings significant additional 
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costs while also granting control to participants. Most significantly, he argues, the real 
motivation for participation often stems, not from an informed understanding, but 
from the participant’s trust in clinic staff and their sense that it is a worthwhile project. 
Thus, he opines, we should move from focussing on the information divulged to 
participants to “the context for obtaining consent and the motivations of those who 
enrol in the project” (207). The rest of his chapter examines these issues, focussing on 
the need for structural safeguards to protect altruism and trust. 
 
In chapter 14, Jean McHale examines the reforms to the regulation of medical 
research on those who lack capacity introduced by the Clinical Trials Regulations,
24
 
the Mental Capacity Act 2005, and the Human Tissue Act 2004.
25
 She argues that 
there is “a real risk” that in ten years time these reforms “will be viewed as a recipe 
for fundamental uncertainty” (233). I agree. I have argued elsewhere that the 
regulation of emergency research is now incoherent and potentially open to legal 
challenge, and this issue has been exacerbated by amendments made to the Clinical 
Trials Regulations in 2006.
26
 
 
In Chapter 15, John Devereux explores the case law on competency, understood as 
“the ability to understand the nature of the treatment”, and examines what is meant by 
the nature of the treatment.
27
 The discussion utilises an impressively wide range of 
English and commonwealth case law, albeit taking as its discursive starting point a 
case that was actually overruled in May 2004.
28
 In the last section before the 
conclusion, Devereux examines the question of whether “in order to be competent, a 
patient needs to demonstrate actual understanding of the treatment information or 
merely an ability to understand treatment information” (252). He opines that this is a 
distinction between understanding the information with which one is presented and 
having the ability to understand information of a similar level of complexity. By way 
of example, he argues, a patient who is able to solve quadratic equations could be 
viewed as having the ability to understand information of the same level of 
complexity relating to her medical condition but, nonetheless, as lacking actual 
understanding of that medical condition where she is so shocked by the diagnosis that 
“she refuses to deal with the situation” (252). With respect, a patient who is unable (as 
opposed to unwilling) to exercise her cognitive abilities in the specific circumstances 
in which she finds herself does not, at that time, possess the ability to understand her 
medical condition. Conceptually at least, there is a difference between being cognitive 
able to make a decision with respect to the given situation (having both the 
dispositional cognitive ability to understand and being occurrently able to exercise 
that ability) and applying those abilities to attain actual understanding.
29
 The apparent 
difficulty is that, in practice, evidence of actual understanding is the best evidence of 
possession of these abilities. Nonetheless, it is possible to conceive of hypothetical 
situations—in addition to those in which the patient has been deprived of the requisite 
information—where a patient could be meaningfully viewed as possessing the 
relevant abilities whilst not actually understanding. Imagine, for example, a patient 
who is fully willing and able to discuss the nature of his terminal disease but chooses 
not to listen to or discuss the nature of a less complex, non-terminal disease that he 
also possesses. Properly considered, English law does not invariably equate non-
understanding with a lack of competence. The Mental Capacity Act 2005 says that a 
person will only lack capacity if he is “unable to make a decision for himself in 
relation to the matter because of an impairment of, or a disturbance of the functioning 
of, the mind or brain” (s.2(1), my emphasis). This has also been declared to be the 
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common law position.
30
 A person who has no impairment preventing him from 
making a decision, but does not actually understand the relevant information, will not 
lack capacity. As Munby J put it in the much maligned Burke decision, 
 
Essentially capacity is dependent upon having the ability, whether or not one chooses to 
use it, to function rationally: having the ability to understand, retain, believe and evaluate 
(i.e., process) and weigh the information which is relevant to the subject-matter.31 
 
Chapters 16–20 
 
In the sixteenth chapter David Meyers analyses a much ignored aspect of the decision 
in Chester v Afshar.
32
 He is not concerned with the issue of the causal link between 
the breach of duty and the injury, but with the nature of the legal duty to inform the 
patient of a 1–2 per cent risk of serious neurological damage inherent in the spinal 
surgery. He starts with the Court of Appeal’s decision in Pearce v United Bristol 
Healthcare.
33
 According to Meyers, Pearce was a “remarkably bold” decision, as it 
effectively adopted the minority judgment in Sidaway v Board of Governors of the 
Bethlem Royal Hospital
34
 via ambiguities in the speeches of the majority, so that a 
doctor is (in effect) required to disclose the information that a reasonable patient 
would want to know (259). This viewpoint has both supporters (of whom I am one) 
and opponents.
35
 Meyers notes that dicta in Chester clearly support Pearce.
36
 He 
points out that the House of Lords could have easily reconciled Sidaway and Chester 
on the basis that Mrs Chester had specifically asked about the risk and there is 
powerful dicta in Sidaway to the effect that a doctor must answer the patient’s 
questions “truthfully” and “fully”.37 Meyers contends, however, the House of Lords 
“did not choose to do that” (263). Instead, he argues, the House of Lords viewed the 
risk as one that the doctor had a duty to disclose on the basis that a reasonable doctor 
would regard it as a significant risk that would affect the judgment of a reasonable 
patient, irrespective of whether or not Mrs Chester had asked about it. 
 
There are a number of limits to the authority of Chester on the breach of duty issue. 
First, their Lordships’ discussion on this issue is technically obiter, as both parties 
accepted the existence of a duty to disclose the specific risk in question to Mrs 
Chester.
38
 Secondly, their Lordships did not purport to overrule Sidaway, which, as 
Meyer recognises, involved the non-disclose of a risk that was “almost identical” 
(256). Approval of the interpretative gloss placed upon Sidaway by Pearce is not the 
same thing as holding that the Sidaway would now be decided differently on its facts. 
Thirdly, the fact that Mrs Chester had asked a specific question about the risks—
which was recognised as imposing a duty to disclose in both Sidaway and Pearce
39—
was arguably a background factor.
40
 Nonetheless, Meyer presents a persuasive 
argument that “it may be that Chester will prove to be more noteworthy for defining 
the scope of the doctor’s duty to warn his or her patient of the risks inherent or special 
in the treatment being proposed” (270). 
 
Also addressing the disclosure of information, Emily Jackson argues that the idea that 
tort law protects patients’ interests in access to information about their medical 
treatment is a “pretence” (286).41 Battery has a very narrow ambit, restricting it to 
exceptional cases, and patients bringing negligence actions are severely hindered by 
the need to show breach of the relevant standard of care and causation. Jackson 
maintains that the present position mistakenly equates the patients’ need information 
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with the need to protect themselves from physical injury caused medical accidents. 
Jackson’s claim is, in essence, that the existing law provides little redress for 
autonomy-focused dignitarian harm.
42
 
 
In chapter 18, John Harris explores some problems applying consent-based reasoning 
to the dead, the unborn, and the incompetent.
43
 Harris forcefully argues that consent 
can be neither a necessary nor sufficient justification for all our actions; and other 
justificatory strategies require careful analysis. For example, according to Harris, 
consent cannot be a necessary justificatory requirement for doing something to or for 
children (for children who are not dressed, fed, etc. would not survive) nor can the 
best interests of the child (for this is incompatible with many routine decisions that 
parents make for their children, such as letting them cross busy roads, eat at 
McDonald’s, and receive MMR vaccines). It is difficult to dissent from the view that 
consent is routinely overplayed as a justificatory tool and Harris’ arguments by 
analogy are, as usual, worthy of serious consideration. 
 
Chapter 19 presents an analysis of the law on negligently caused psychiatric harm, 
written by Harvey Teff.
44
 He argues that the significance of “sudden shock” and 
“horrifying event” in recent cases has diminished “but it still has undue capacity to 
determine legal outcomes” (316). The result, Teff persuasive concludes, is a mismatch 
of law and medicine, whereby the law appeals to outdated ideas disconnected from 
contemporary clinical understanding of psychiatric harm. 
 
Elaine Sutherland, in the twentieth chapter, considers whether there is a legally 
recognised right not to procreate.
45
 She points out that since many individuals cannot 
realistically avoid procreation by celibacy or engaging only in same sex relationships, 
legal systems have had to face the choice not to procreate in a variety of 
circumstances. Legal systems, Sutherland claims, are generally willing to respect the 
choice not to procreate when asked to referee the interests of two private individuals 
(such as where one spouse seeks divorce because of the other’s intentional non-
procreation), but are less so where an innocent third party is involved (such as where 
one parent sues the other for the conception of a child following the defendant’s 
deception on the lack of the need for additional contraceptive precautions). Sutherland 
thereby elicits an underlying principle that goes a long way towards explaining 
apparently divergent responses towards the right not to procreate. 
 
Chapters 20–25 
 
Bernard Dickens, in chapter 21, presents a detailed, thought-provoking critique of 
legal responses to conscientious objection.
46
 Doctors’ recourse to conscientious 
objection most commonly takes the form of refusals to participate in procedures 
concerned with abortion and other matters of reproductive health on the grounds of 
religious conviction. Unfortunately, overly broad conscientious objection clauses can, 
Dickens argues, easily lead to protections that serve as a shield for religious 
conviction becoming a sword by which compliance with religious beliefs is imposed 
upon those who do not share them. This is likely to disproportionately affect 
particular groups, such as women and those unable to seek alternative access to the 
treatment in question. As Dickens recognises, little comfort is likely to derive from 
the realisation that, occasionally, conscientious objection clauses can unintentionally 
protect those with convictions diametrically opposed to the group they are intended to 
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protect. The extremely broad clause in the Mississippi Health Care Rights of 
Conscience Act (341–343) might unintentionally protect abortion providers opposed 
to complying with laws requiring the distribution of anti-abortion pamphlets but it 
could also protect doctors who refuse to terminate a life-endangering pregnancy. This 
chapter, therefore, highlights the danger of broad conscience clauses that are capable 
of denying access to healthcare that could not, legally or ethically, be denied by more 
direct means. 
 
Kerry Petersen devotes chapter 22 to a topic touched on by Sutherland and Dickens—
the regulation of abortion.
47
 She argues that in Australia abortion is predominately 
treated as a health matter, which has contained the controversy and serves the health 
interests of women, but reduces the scope for debate on the underlying issues and on 
social policies to reduce the incidence of abortion (esp. 355 and 368). Sheldon has 
previously made many of these points in relation to the regulation of abortion in 
Britain.
48
 Sheldon has, in particular, argued that the “medicalisation” of abortion has 
paved “the way for women’s access to the provision of safe, legal terminations”, 
“played a central role in the apparent depoliticisation of abortion”, and that this 
reduces the scope for those of a pro-choice persuasion to ensure the realisation of their 
values in practice.
49
 While Petersen does not mention Sheldon’s work, Petersen 
suggests that she is no more willing to accept the pro-choice position than she is the 
pro-life position, arguing that both are polarised extremes. 
 
In chapter 23, Penelope Beem and Derek Morgan consider the regulation of, and 
access to, IVF services in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Ireland, and the UK.
50
 The 
linking idea, encapsulated by the words of the Tina Turner song alluded to by the title, 
is that love has little to do with it, though other values and emotions (“second hand 
emotions”) can be identified. The chapter thereby presents an interesting update on 
the development of regulatory approaches to IVF and its related cousins, and the 
general direction of regulatory responses. 
 
Following on from Beem and Morgan’s analysis of the regulation of IVF, Michael 
Freeman examines a specific issue brought about by use of developments in assisted 
reproductive technology: the use of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PDG) and 
tissue typing (HLA) to enable the selection of an embryo that is intended to become a 
donor for an existing, sick child.
51
 Freeman explores the regulatory and ethical aspects 
of creating so-called “saviour siblings”, arguing that the Court of Appeal and House 
of Lords in the Hashmi case reached the right decision.
52
 He expresses concern, 
however, that the House of Lords did not consider the procedures that may lawfully 
be applied to the subsequent child beyond the trite statement that any operation upon 
the child must be in the child’s best interests. Freeman also claims that the HFEA 
would permit parents to use PGD and tissue typing to treat their own illness (404), 
though no source is cited.
53
 In any event, many regulatory developments have taken 
place since this chapter was published. In particular, the Government has issued both 
a White Paper proposing significant regulatory changes (December 2006) and draft 
replacement legislation (May 2007),
54
 and the HFEA has issued a new edition of its 
Code of Practice.
55
 The new Code of Practice, which came into force on 5 July 2007, 
states that tissue typing is expected to be available only when the resulting child is to 
be used to treat “an existing child who is affected by a serious or life-threatening 
condition”.56 The new draft legislation explicitly restricts tissue typing to such 
circumstances
57
 and goes on to state that the regulatory authority must consider the 
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present or future availability of any alternative sources of tissue for treating the 
sibling and the likely  long-term effect on the donor sibling.
58
 
 
In chapter 25, Søren Holm examines the so-called “non-identity problem”,59 as 
seminally advanced and labelled by Derek Parfit.
60
 Parfit famously noted that some 
reproductive decisions will result in the existence of different individuals and, thus, 
raise questions about whether any harm or wrong can be done to an individual whose 
very existence depends on that decision. (I have argued elsewhere that this 
argumentative strategy has particular purchase on rights-based moral theories.)
61
 
Holm draws out the implications of two responses to the non-identity problem, which 
he identifies as the “standard analysis” and the “Harris analysis”. The standard 
analysis holds that a person has no legitimate complaint about an act that is a 
necessary condition of its existence, unless that person’s life is so bad that its life is 
not worth living (411). The Harris analysis is the view, attributed to John Harris, that 
X harms Y when X is in a disabling or hurtful condition and Y is responsible for X 
being in that condition, and that the wrong of wrongful life actions is increasing 
avoidable suffering in the world (416). Holm seeks to challenge these views by 
constructing hypothetical scenarios with “highly counter intuitive” consequences 
(415), including demonstrating that some extreme actions would be judged legitimate 
by both accounts (417). The persuasive import of such an argumentative strategy is 
limited to those moral theorists adhering to the particular intuitions in play.  
 
Chapters 26–30 
 
Chapters 26 to 30 address end of life decisions. In the first of these chapters, Loane 
Skene examines requests for life-prolonging treatment in the light of the Burke case,
62
 
offering support for the decision of the Court of Appeal over that of Munby J at first 
instance.
63
 She argues that the only possible duty to provide treatment arises from the 
“hospital-patient relationship and not from the patient’s wish for the treatment” (429). 
This theme is continued in the chapter written by Sheila McLean, the editor of this 
collection.
64
 McLean argues that Burke further entrenched in law the notion that 
artificial nutrition and hydration (ANH) is medical treatment, as had been recognised 
in Bland.
65
 While accepting that no court lower than the House of Lords could now 
hold otherwise, McLean laments this characterisation of ANH. She argues that a 
decoupling of AHN from medical treatment might have some (though not significant) 
resource implications, but “failure to do so has a cost in terms of humanity” (446), 
because ANH is inappropriately being treated in the same way as activities that 
“indubitably are medical treatments” (444). Classifying ANH as basic care, and 
thereby not medical treatment, would seem to impose a duty on doctors to administer 
ANH to any patient whose life could be sustained by it and place public policy 
limitations on the ability of any patient to refuse it.
66
 Thus, such a response would 
also have consequences beyond those that are purely resource-focused. Imagine, for 
example, that Leslie Burke had wanted to refuse ANH. 
 
In chapter 28, Tom Campbell claims that the notion of “euthanasia as a human right” 
needs to be re-characterised to avoid underemphasising “humanitarian 
considerations”.67 This is followed by Len Doyal’s engaging chapter arguing for the 
legalisation of non-voluntary and voluntary euthanasia as a means of rendering 
English law internally coherent and compliant with societal expectations.
68
 Doyal’s 
argument is imaginatively conducted by way of a hypothetical debate among 
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clinicians arguing over the approach advanced in Mason’s co-authored book Law and 
Medical Ethics. Doyal rejects the book’s reliance on the empirical slippery slope 
argument to support the case against legalisation—we have already seen that in the 
rejection of this argument Doyal is supported by Mason’s current co-author of Law 
and Medical Ethics. 
 
John Keown, in chapter 30, presents an impassioned defence of Recommendation 
1418 passed by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in 1999 and 
opposing the legislation of euthanasia.
69
 As readers have come to expect from 
Keown’s work, his chapter makes many powerful logical points alongside claims that 
rest on particular moral premises.
70
 Consider Keown’s claim that 
 
even if there were a serious discrepancy between the law and practice of voluntary 
euthanasia it would not follow that the gap should be narrowed by relaxing the law. Many 
criminal laws are regularly broken. Some prohibitions, such as the law against possessing 
hard drugs, are frequently breached without detection but it does not follow that the law 
should therefore be relaxed to accommodate those who snort cocaine. (483) 
 
Since a serious discrepancy between a prohibition and the occurrence of the 
prohibited activity could justify removal of that prohibition if the justification for it 
were purely instrumental, Keown’s claim requires further moral premises. He does go 
on to hint at these by advancing the view that euthanasia is intrinsically wrong, so that 
to criminalise “the decision to be intentionally killed, or to be helped to commit 
suicide…does not deny the patient’s dignity but affirms it” (488). This conception of 
dignity holds that an individual can violate his or her own dignity, irrespective of 
utility considerations or the voluntary choice of that individual. As Beyleveld and 
Brownsword point out, such a conception of dignity (which they label “dignity as 
constraint”) is opposed by another internally coherent conception (which they label 
“dignity as empowerment”).71 It follows that it is not sufficient for Keown to merely 
assert his conception of dignity. 
 
Chapters 31–37 
 
It is much more difficult to find a single unifying theme for chapters 31 to 37. Chapter 
31—written by Denise Avard, Linda Kharaboyan, and Bartha Knoppers—insightfully 
analyses the socio-ethical implications of newborn screening for sickle cell disease 
(SCD).
72
 They raise three main socio-ethical concerns: the difficulties presented by 
the identification of carriers, whether neonatal screening should be universal or 
selective, and the potential of consumer groups. We are told, for example, that despite 
early diagnosis and treatment being capable of significantly improving life expectancy 
and quality of life, most jurisdictions risk failing to identify all suffers by adopting 
selective neonatal screening programmes.
73
 
 
In Chapter 32, Mark Henaghan considers the regulation of genetic medicine in New 
Zealand.
74
 Henaghan reveals, for example, that the regulatory policy towards HLA 
tissue-typing requires the affected child to have a hereditary gene disorder, like the 
much criticised previous policy of the UK’s Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority.
75
 The overall regulatory framework, however, remains “piecemeal” and 
lacks “any clear unitary message” (526).  
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Roger Brownsword critically analyses attempts to invoke the harm principle as a 
regulative standard for pluralistic communities, using human cloning as the test 
case.
76
 He sketches a particular kind of pluralism, a three-way disagreement on 
fundamental values with utilitarian, human rights, and dignitarian thinking occupying 
different corners of a “bioethical triangle”. Such pluralism, he argues, undermines the 
notion that a neutral regulative standard can be found in the idea that “we should do 
no harm to others (primum no nocere)” (528). The problem is that the harm principle 
is not neutral: “its regulative application turns on how the notion of ‘harm’ and the 
category of ‘others’ are interpreted; and these key ideas only take on a specific 
meaning once they are interpreted through the lens of a particular angle of the 
bioethical triangle” (537). The harm principle, thus, merely restates the challenge of 
pluralism. The harm principle cannot, as Montgomery has it in chapter one, provide 
an alternative to the imposition of a particular moral position; its content must derive 
from a particular moral position. 
 
Marie Fox, in chapter 34, argues that healthcare law and healthcare lawyers disregard 
the harm caused to animals by new biotechnologies.
77
 This is followed by Kenneth 
Norrie’s chapter on the unrelated issue of the regulatory response to gender and those 
who seek to change from one to the other.
78
 He argues that while the inadequacies of 
one decision of the House of Lords
79
 made the enactment of the Gender Recognition 
Act 2004 inevitable, a proper application of the reasoning of a later decision
80
 limits 
its effect to marriage and, perhaps, re-registration of birth certificates. 
 
The last two chapters examine the impact of recent scandals, reforms, and patient 
claims on doctors and the healthcare system. Christopher Newdick analyses the 
difficulties presented by limited healthcare resources and growing patient demands.
81
 
Vivienne Harpwood enumerates and examines the impact of patient demands on 
doctors.
82
 Together these chapters helpfully seek to redress the imbalance created by 
focus upon the rights and demands of individual patients abstracted from their wider 
context. 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
This article is no more than an invitation to the festschrift’s diverse collection of 
topics and themes, the sheer breadth of which is an appropriate tribute to the work of 
Ken Mason.
83
 While there are admittedly one or two pebbles filling what I am 
tempted to dismiss as much needed gaps, this book is packed with real gems and 
should therefore be given space on the shelves of all serious medical lawyers. As the 
title suggests, this book invites readers to consider the challenges of medical law and 
ethics. One of the most pressing of these challenges is the existence of irreconcilable 
moral views within pluralist communities. Even where there is apparently little 
variance of views on regulatory policy or outcome, there are often deep divisions on 
the underlying ethical principles, their weight, or justificatory support. In the face of 
alternative, firmly held and internally consistent intuitions, moral intuitionism is 
simply impotent, no matter how considered those intuitions or how carefully they are 
placed in reflective equilibrium.
84
 While many of the book’s authors are nonetheless 
wedded to positions within moral intuitionism,
85
 there are nods in the direction of 
moral foundationalism.
86
 Overall, this book serves as an excellent overview of many 
important issues in medical law. 
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